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A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO TESTIFY:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESUMING WAIVER
FROM A SILENT RECORD
ABSTRACT
The area of criminal law is constantly being refined and developed. At
trial, criminal defendants are often faced with the potential reality of
waiving their most basic fundamental rights. As a result, careful
consideration is necessary when analyzing a waiver of these rights. In Rock
v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments guaranteed a criminal defendant the right to testify at trial on
his own behalf. But where courts require criminal defendants to
affirmatively waive most of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as
the right to an attorney or the right to a jury trial, most circuit courts, as well
as the state of North Dakota, do not require criminal defendants to
affirmatively waive their constitutionally guaranteed right to testify at their
own criminal trial. Instead, courts presume a waiver has occurred when, at
the trial’s conclusion, the defendant’s attorney has rested the case without
the defendant having testified. This Article discusses the dangers of this
presumption, including an analysis of the evolution of a criminal
defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. When freedom is at stake, it
is important for criminal defendants to receive their full day in court. In
light of the vulnerable position they find themselves, it is imperative for
criminal defendants to retain the ability to fully exercise their
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Criminal law is inherently interesting. People are fascinated with the
facts underlying criminal cases. The constitutional protections afforded to
criminal defendants, however, often take a backseat to the details
surrounding the criminal act. Many criminal defendants are not aware of
our most basic rights in the criminal setting, such as the right to an attorney
or the right to a jury trial.1 These basic constitutional rights are of the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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utmost importance considering that a person’s freedom is in jeopardy
should they be found guilty. Because of the importance of defendants’
rights in the criminal setting, this is an area of law that is constantly
evolving and being perpetually developed and refined.2
Unlike the right to a jury trial or the right to an attorney, the criminal
defendant’s right to testify is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the
Constitution or its Amendments. In Rock v. Arkansas,3 however, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a criminal
defendant the right to testify at trial on his own behalf, holding “[t]here is
no justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to
offer his own testimony.”4 Since this decision, courts have disagreed in
interpreting how a defendant may waive this constitutionally protected
right.5 Although courts agree that in order to waive the right to testify, a
criminal defendant must do so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,6
courts disagree on how to apply this standard. Today, most courts hold that
a defendant’s right to testify is waived if the defendant has not testified by
the end of trial.7 If the defendant himself does not make an objection on the
record, it is presumed that he has waived that right.8 In other words, courts
simply assume a defendant has waived his right to testify absent any sort of
record or confirmation that the defendant actually wishes to waive this very
important right.
There are several problems with this approach. First, defendants do not
usually address the court directly. Rather, it is their attorney who does so.
If a defendant speaks, he often faces swift reprimand from the court.9
Second, defendants and their attorneys also often disagree on whether it
would be beneficial for the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and it is

2. See, e.g., United States v. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2151 (2013) (holding that any fact
that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an actual element of the crime and
must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.
545 (2002)).
3. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
4. Id. at 49-53.
5. See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th
Cir. 1991); Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1989). But see United States v.
Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
6. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756 (requiring a waiver of the right to testify to be “intentional
and to be intentional must be known to the one who gives it up”); Teague, 908 F.2d at 759 (waiver
must be “knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent”); United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089,
1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (waiver of the right must be “knowing and intentional”).
7. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751-52; Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d at
1094-95.
8. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.2d at 1094-95.
9. Martinez, 883 F.2d at 770 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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obvious that attorneys are in a position of power over the defendants, as
they speak directly to the court and are more knowledgeable in criminal law
and procedure. Third, because attorneys have the responsibility to advise
the defendant of his right to testify, whether or not it is wise to do so, as
well as the strategic implications of that decision,10 attorneys may pressure
and advise their clients not to testify even when the defendant may
desperately wish to do so. Because of criminal defendants’ general lack of
knowledge of the law and the vulnerable position they find themselves in at
their own criminal trial, it is irresponsible for courts to assume defendants
have waived their constitutionally guaranteed right to testify without
making an affirmative record of him or her doing so. This is especially true
in light of the fact that an affirmative record must be made of defendants
waiving other constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to an
attorney and the right to a jury trial.11
This Note will examine several of these issues. It will examine the
problems associated with presuming a waiver of the right to testify from a
silent record. It will discuss several constitutional rights guaranteed to
criminal defendants, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel and
the right to a jury trial. It also examines how courts approach the waiver of
these constitutional rights versus the current approach of assuming a
defendant has waived the right to testify when the record is silent on the
issue.
After a historical and procedural analysis of these constitutional rights
in the criminal setting, this Note proposes a simple solution to the
inconsistencies surrounding the waiver of a defendant’s constitutional right
to testify. Specifically, a judge may simply ask the defendant, outside the
presence of the jury, if he or she wishes to testify. An affirmative record of
this interaction between the defendant and the court ultimately may
safeguard this fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right and facilitate
effective communication in the attorney-client relationship. Courtroom
efficiency would also benefit, as there will no longer be doubt as to whether
a defendant was denied his right to testify, thereby eliminating the grounds
for an appeal on the issue. In order to fully understand the many
constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants, a comparison of
these rights and how they have evolved is an important starting point.

10. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992).
11. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
512-13 (1962).

2013]

NOTE

713

II. THE DEFENDANT’S FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN THE CRIMINAL SETTING
This section explores, compares, and contrasts several rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants through the Constitution and its
Amendments. The right to an attorney and the right to a jury trial, among
others, are found within the Sixth Amendment, while the right to testify is
not. The right to testify, however, is firmly rooted in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and is arguably the most important of these rights,
as evidenced by the language used in several United States Supreme Court
and circuit court decisions.12
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states:
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.13
The language granting a defendant the right to an attorney is explicit in
the Sixth Amendment. In Miranda v. Arizona,14 Chief Justice Warren held
that the “precious” right to an attorney was “fixed in our Constitution only
after centuries of persecution and struggle.”15 And in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall, “[our rights] were secured ‘for ages to come, and designed
to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach
it[.]’”16
In Johnson v. Zerbst,17 the Supreme Court set forth the standard to be
used in measuring a criminal defendant’s waiver of his or her
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
“A waiver is . . . an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”18 Further
12. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (“[A]n accused’s right to present his
own version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than
the right of self-representation.”) (emphasis added).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Id. at 442.
16. Id. (quoting Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821)).
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18. Id. at 464.
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and specifically regarding the right to counsel, Faretta v. California19 held
that a defendant must be voluntarily exercising his own free will and must
knowingly and intelligently relinquish the right to counsel.20 Other
Supreme Court cases have reiterated this sentiment.21
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer’s help are not legal formalisms. Such rights rest on
considerations that go to the substance of an accused’s position before the
law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the
administration of justice. An accused must have the means of presenting
his best defense. He must have time and facilities for investigation and for
the production of evidence. Evidence and truth are, however, of no avail
unless they can be adequately presented. Essential fairness is lacking if an
accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution does
not force a lawyer upon a defendant. A defendant may waive the
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open.22
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel is extremely
important, and the Supreme Court has noted it will not be taken for granted.
Due to the defendant’s right to counsel being of such importance, the
Supreme Court has held that a waiver of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to counsel cannot be implied from a silent record.23 “The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver.”24 Much like this fundamental right
to counsel, the right to a trial by jury has also been found to be of
significant importance in the eyes of the Supreme Court, and it also requires
an affirmative, on-record waiver in order to be relinquished.25

19. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
20. Id. at 835.
21. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1962) (holding that a defendant must
intelligently and understandingly waive the fundamental right to counsel); Adams v. United States
ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942) (holding that a defendant must be competent to make an
intelligent, informed choice of whether to waive a fundamental right).
22. Adams, 317 U.S. at 279.
23. See Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516 (holding that “[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is
impermissible.”).
24. Id.
25. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
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B. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
Like the fundamental right to be assisted by counsel, the right to a jury
trial is also explicit in the language of the Sixth Amendment.26 Boykin v.
Alabama27 also held that, much like the fundamental right of assistance of
counsel, the right to a jury trial cannot be presumed from a silent record.28
For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of
conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion,
terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect
cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an effective
waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course
governed by federal standards.29
Boykin also noted that several constitutional provisions are implicated
if a defendant seeks to waive the right to a jury trial and enter a guilty
plea.30
First, the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory
self-incrimination is implicated when a defendant chooses to plead guilty.31
Along with the guarantee of the right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the right to confront one’s accusers is also implicated.32
Further, whether an accused has waived his right to a trial by jury is
dependent upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.33
Boykin then explicitly held that a waiver of all of these fundamental
rights cannot be presumed from a silent record.34 When a defendant’s life
and freedom are at stake, courts must be as careful as possible in
determining whether a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights has taken
place, and courts must make sure a defendant has a full understanding of the
consequences of his guilty plea.35 When a judge does these things, an
adequate record is then preserved, the subsequent conviction is now further
insulated from burdensome appeals and attacks,36 and the record of the
conviction is no longer ambiguous. As Boykin stated, making an

26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
28. Id. at 242.
29. Id. at 242-43 (internal citation omitted).
30. Id. at 243.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942); see also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). (determining a waiver of a fundamental right
“depend[s] . . . upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case”).
34. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
35. Id. at 243-44.
36. Id.
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affirmative record of such a waiver “forestalls the spin-off of collateral
proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.”37
Both the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial are constitutionally
guaranteed rights. These fundamental rights trigger many constitutional
implications and are protected by several Amendments.38 The criminal
defendant’s right to testify on his or her own behalf at his or her own trial is
no different.
C. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON THEIR
OWN BEHALF
The right to testify was not always a guaranteed right. It was not until
recently that the Supreme Court officially recognized that the right of a
criminal defendant to testify on his or her own behalf was fundamental and
protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.39 In 1864,
Maine became the first state to adopt a statute establishing criminal
defendants as competent to offer testimony, and other states followed suit.40
But the criminal defendant’s right to testify did not become constitutionally
guaranteed until 1987.41 It was only through statute that the federal
government granted the right of criminal defendants to testify.42
Before Rock v. Arkansas held the right to testify to be constitutionally
guaranteed, the First Circuit, in United States v. Systems Architects, Inc.,43
ruled on the statutory grant of the right to testify. Systems Architects held
that defendants were misguided in asserting that the court had an
affirmative duty to confirm that defendants had knowingly and intelligently
waived their right to testify.44 Because the right to testify was not
constitutionally guaranteed at the time this decision was rendered, the

37. Id.
38. See supra Parts II.A-B.
39. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987).
40. See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 ME. LAWS 214 (codified as amended at ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1315 (2011)).
41. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 49-53.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982)
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United
States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State,
District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a
competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him.
(emphasis added).
43. 757 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 375.
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Systems Architects court based its holding and reasoning on the statutory
grant of the right to testify.45
In rendering its decision, the First Circuit relied heavily on the actual
statutory language, which specifically stated that the defendant may testify
“at his own request.”46 This language led the court to hold that the
defendant “must act affirmatively” at the time of trial to preserve his right
to testify.47 The First Circuit’s statement that “[t]here is no constitutional or
statutory mandate that a trial court inquire further into a defendant’s
decision to not testify under the facts here” further limited its holding.48
Because Systems Architects was decided before the right to testify was
deemed to be fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed, the decision
only gave a cursory glance at the possible constitutional implications
regarding a waiver of this right, stating that the “due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment may be understood to grant to the accused the right to
testify[.]”49
It was not until two years later that the landmark case of Rock v.
Arkansas held that criminal defendants have a fundamental and
constitutionally guaranteed right to testify on their own behalf.50 In Rock,
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and the Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed this conviction.51 The defendant then appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed and remanded the
case,52 holding that the Arkansas rule excluding the defendant’s
hypnotically refreshed testimony impermissibly impinged on the
defendant’s right to testify on her own behalf.53
Rock noted that the right to testify is derived from the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.54 In recognizing that criminal defendants have a
constitutionally guaranteed right to testify, as opposed to a statutorily
guaranteed right to testify, the Supreme Court noted that the right to testify
is a “necessary ingredient[] of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that
no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.”55 The right

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.; see also supra note 42.
Sys. Architects, 757 F.2d at 375 (emphasizing the statutory language).
Id.
Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
Id. at 375.
483 U.S. at 49-53.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
Rock, 483 U.S. at 51.
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to testify is a right that is “essential to due process of law in a fair adversary
process.”56
This right is also grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, which grants an accused the right to call witnesses
whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense.57 Simply put, the
Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense.”58 Further, the right to testify is “a necessary corollary to the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against compelled testimony.”59 It is also
exceedingly important to note that “an accused’s right to present his own
version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a
personal defense than the right of self-representation[.]”60
Furthermore, Rock also noted that the Supreme Court has “[o]n
numerous occasions . . . proceeded on the premise that the right to testify on
one’s own behalf in defense to a criminal charge is a fundamental
constitutional right.”61 Citing Harris v. New York,62 the Court noted that
“[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to
refuse to do so.”63 Rock articulated the constitutional foundations for a
criminal defendant’s right to testify. Today, however, courts are divided in
interpreting how a defendant waives this constitutional right.
III. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO TESTIFY
In order to waive the constitutional right to counsel, there must be an
affirmative record made showing that the defendant understood his right to
counsel, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that
right.64 Put another way, a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel

56. Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
57. Id. at 52.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 53 n.10 (emphasis added).
62. 401 U.S. 222 (1975).
63. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225).
64. See supra Part II.A.
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cannot be presumed from a silent record.65 The same is also true when a
defendant wishes to plead guilty and waive his right to a jury trial. 66 But
most courts do not follow this line of reasoning when it comes to a
defendant waiving right to testify.67 Instead, most courts hold that if the
defendant himself does not make an objection on the record, it is presumed
that he has waived his right to testify.68 Even though a defendant has the
“ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the
case,” including whether or not to testify,69 most courts simply make the
assumption that a defendant has waived his constitutional right to testify
absent any sort of record or confirmation that the defendant actually wished
to waive this very important right.
A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In United States v. Bernloehr,70 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a criminal defendant’s waiver of his right to testify, like his waiver
of other constitutional rights, should be made voluntarily and knowingly.71
The Eighth Circuit, however, also held that an accused “must act
affirmatively” when his defense counsel rests its case without calling the
defendant to the stand.72 Interestingly, Bernloehr was decided the same
year as Rock.73 In fact, in holding that an accused must affirmatively object
if he would like to testify, the Eighth Circuit erroneously relied on United
States v. Systems Architects, Inc.74 which, as previously discussed, was
decided two years before Rock v. Arkansas held that the right to testify was
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.75 Systems Architects,
as well as the other cases cited by the Eighth Circuit in its holding, 76 were
all cases decided based on the fact that the right to testify was statutorily,

65. Id.
66. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see also Part II.B.
67. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text
68. See supra note 7.
69. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
70. 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 751.
72. Id. at 751-52 (quoting United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375 (1st
Cir. 1985)) (other internal citations omitted).
73. See supra notes 3, 5.
74. 757 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1985).
75. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987).
76. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751-52 (citing United States v. Sys. Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d
373, 375 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 1983) (right
to testify not denied where, inter alia, “defendant made no objection to his attorney’s statements
that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify”); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982) (“the
person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness”) (emphasis added)).
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rather than constitutionally, guaranteed.77 In support of its holding,
Bernloehr even cited to 18 U.S.C. § 3481, the statutory grant of the right to
testify, which states that the defendant must act affirmatively if he wishes to
testify but is being prevented from doing so.78 Bernloehr, although based
on an irrelevant law, still stands today, as it has not been overturned. In
fact, Bernloehr’s language is cited to by other circuit courts in holdings
echoing the Eighth Circuit’s language.79
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In United States v. Martinez,80 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a defendant’s right to testify may be waived by his conduct.81 Again
relying on Bernloehr’s incorrect holding, the Ninth Circuit held that “courts
have no affirmative duty . . . to address a silent defendant and inquire
whether he knowingly and intelligently waives the right to testify.”82 In
United States v. Pino-Noriega,83 the Ninth Circuit further elaborated,
stating that a defendant who wants to reject his attorney’s advice and take
the stand may do so by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court, or
discharging his lawyer.84 The court also stated that when a defendant
remains silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as a
witness, he waives the right to testify.85
In a rather powerful dissent to Martinez, Judge Reinhardt found this
holding incorrect. Reinhardt noted that it is unwise to require a defendant
to “ignore admonishments of counsel, interrupt the trial proceedings, and
interject himself, uninvited, into the fray.”86 He further stated that
defendants “are trained to be seen and not heard. Court dictates are clear
and authoritative; defendants who speak without invitation are not only
silenced but threatened with the judicial contempt power.” 87 Judge
Reinhardt was extremely dissatisfied with the majority holding, and noted
its inconsistencies, stating that “[t]his court unanimously concludes that the
right to testify is a fundamental right that belongs to the defendant. By
77. See id.
78. See supra note 46; see also supra note 75.
79. See infra Parts III.B-D.
80. 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 759.
82. Id. at 760 (citing United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751-52 (8th Cir. 1987)
(internal citations omitted)).
83. 189 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 1095.
85. Id. (internal citations omitted).
86. Martinez, 883 F.2d at 770 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
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definition, the majority concedes that only the defendant, himself, may
make the decision, and that he does not cede it to his attorney by electing to
be represented by counsel.”88 However, “what the majority giveth with one
hand, it taketh away with the other.”89 Judge Reinhardt’s statement referred
to the fact that although the decision on whether or not to testify belongs
with only the defendant himself, the defendant’s attorney in Martinez
explicitly testified that he made the decision that his defendant would not
take the stand.90
C. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
United States v. Teague,91 held that a defendant’s right to testify is
fundamental and personal to the defendant himself, such that it may not be
effectively waived by counsel against the defendant’s will, and that the
defendant in Teague was prejudiced by the denial of this right to testify,
thus requiring a new trial.92 The Eleventh Circuit stated that there are
certain tactical decisions made by defense attorneys over the course of their
representation of defendants that “implicitly involve the waiver of
constitutional rights” but do not require the defendant’s consent.93 But
“[w]here an inherently personal right of fundamental importance is
involved, the defendant’s [personal] consent is required.”94 Teague noted
several inherently personal rights with such fundamental importance that
only the defendant, not counsel, may waive them, including the right to
plead guilty,95 the right to a jury trial,96 the right to counsel,97 and the right
to an appeal.98 The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s right to testify is

88. Id. at 762.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 761 (citing to Martinez’s attorney’s testimony during post-trial proceedings, Judge
Reinhardt notes that;
Bobby Martinez sought to testify in his own defense. He repeatedly asked his attorney
to put him on the stand, but he was refused the opportunity to testify in absolute terms.
“I told Mr. Martinez that I was not going to call him as a witness in his defense. He
expressed to me the desire to testify; and I said no way, that I thought it was suicidal
for him to testify, and it would be an error in judgment; and that was it. I just made
the decision he was not going to testify, I refused to call him, and that was the way it
went down.”
91. 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 752.
93. Id. at 758 (citing United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1990)).
94. Id.
95. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
96. Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942).
97. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
98. Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
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no different, citing Rock’s holding in that the right to testify is rooted in the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.99
Teague noted that Rock’s holding states that Sixth Amendment granted
the accused “personally” the right to make his defense.100 Rock’s holding,
in turn, cited Faretta v. California,101 which held that the right of the
defendant to conduct his own defense is the defendant’s own choice to
make.102 The defendant’s choice “must be honored out of that respect for
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” 103 Teague then reasoned
that implicit in Faretta’s holding is the notion that when the government
brings an individual to face criminal charges, “that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the law” requires that the defendant be allowed, if
he so desires, to speak directly to his accusers, at which point the court and
jury will decide his fate.104
The fact that a defendant has failed to speak up, out of turn, and object
on the record was “of little, if any, probative value in determining whether
the decision that the defendant would not testify was the defendant’s own
decision.”105 In support, the Eleventh Circuit offered a logical and
compelling argument, stating:
In affording a criminal defendant a fundamental right to counsel,
the Constitution recognizes that criminal defendants are often
unschooled in the intricacies of our criminal justice system, and
that without the assistance of counsel, will likely suffer an
overwhelming disadvantage in presenting their defense. The
defendant relies on his counsel to understand the process of the
trial itself and to recognize the proper time for the defendant to be
called as a witness. The defendant may not realize until after the
jury has retired to deliberate that the proper time for his testimony
has passed. Furthermore, once a defendant elects to take
advantage of his right to counsel, he is told that all further
communications with the court and the prosecutor should be made
through his attorney. Aside from any testimony he may give at
pre-trial hearings or during trial, a defendant is not permitted to
speak directly to the court. In fact, in the interests of decorum and
99. Teague, 908 F.2d at 758; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987).
100. Teague, 908 F.2d at 758.
101. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
102. Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
103. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted).
104. Teague, 908 F.2d at 759 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834).
105. Id. (citing Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
defendant had forfeited his right to be present at trial by interrupting proceedings after warning by
judge, even though defendant’s behavior was neither abusive nor violent)).
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the smooth administration of justice, defendants who speak out of
turn at their own trials are quickly reprimanded, and sometimes
banned from the courtroom, by the court. It would be anomalous
to consider the right to counsel of fundamental importance because
of the common lack of understanding of the trial process by
defendants, and to require a defendant to rely on his attorney to be
his sole spokesperson in the courtroom, while at the same time
holding that by failing to speak out at the proper time a defendant
has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of a personal
right of fundamental importance such as the right to testify.106
Teague makes a sound argument. Disappointingly, however, this
holding was vacated and the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en
banc.107 The court then filed another opinion affirming the defendant’s
fundamental right to testify, although framing the issue (defense counsel’s
alleged refusal to let Teague testify) as one of ineffective assistance of
counsel.108 Alaska’s Supreme Court, however, found this erroneous, and
for good reason. Characterizing the issue as one of ineffective assistance of
counsel “does not provide the proper framework for reviewing the
constitutional violation at issue.”109 The defendant’s personal decision
regarding whether or not to testify implicates a defendant’s Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, not merely the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.110
D. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSITION
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also weighed in on the matter
several times. Unfortunately, North Dakota’s decisions, much like the
Ninth Circuit’s, rely on the incorrect Bernloehr holding from the Eighth
Circuit. In State v. Antoine,111 North Dakota held that a defendant has the
duty to act affirmatively in circumstances when the defendant did not
voluntarily agree on the decision not to testify.112 The decision stated that
“if the defendant wants to testify, he can reject his attorney’s tactical
decision by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court, or discharging his

106. Id. at 759-60.
107. United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th
Cir. 1991).
108. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1992).
109. LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217, 220 (Alaska 1991).
110. Id
111. 1997 ND 100, 564 N.W.2d 637.
112. Id. ¶ 6, 564 N.W.2d at 639 (citing United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751
(8th Cir. 1987)).
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lawyer.”113 The North Dakota Supreme Court also found the facts in
Antoine “analogous to Bernloehr,” which, as previously mentioned, is
based on the now irrelevant statutory grant of a criminal defendant’s right
to testify, rather than the constitutionally guaranteed right to do so.114
Ten years later, North Dakota decided State v. Mulske.115 In the
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that “if an accused desires
to exercise her constitutional right to testify[,] the accused must act
affirmatively and express to the court her desire to do so at the appropriate
time or a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right is deemed to have
occurred.”116 These decisions are incorrect in that they cite to cases that are
no longer on point nor relevant. These decisions also do nothing to rebut
Teague’s clear and succinct reasoning as to why a defendant does not know
the “appropriate time” to speak to the court, nor the fact that the defendant
is often not allowed to even speak to the court in the first place.117
E. OTHER COURTS
There are a few jurisdictions that hold that a defendant’s fundamental
right to testify cannot be presumed from a silent record. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals “regard[s] as highly questionable the proposition
that a defendant’s failure to object at trial to counsel’s refusal to allow him
to take the stand constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s constitutional right
to testify on his own behalf.”118 After all, it is the defendant, not his lawyer
or the state, who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.119
In some jurisdictions, in order for a defendant to waive his or her right
to testify, the trial court must make an on-the-record inquiry into whether
the defendant understands his or her right and wishes to waive it. 120 Other
jurisdictions have held that an on-the-record inquiry, though not required, is
advisable.121 In United States v. DiSalvo,122 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993)).
114. Id. ¶ 8, 564 N.W.2d at 639; see also supra Part III.A.
115. 2007 ND 43, 729 N.W.2d 129.
116. Id. ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d at 131 (citing Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752).
117. See supra Part III.C.
118. See United States v. Vargas, 920 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1990).
119. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
120. State v. Tuplin, 901 A.2d 792, 797 (Me. 2006) (citing People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504,
507-08 (Colo. 1984); LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217, 222 (Alaska 1991); Tachibana v. State, 900
P.2d 1293, 1303 (Haw. 1995)).
121. Tuplin, 901 A.2d at 797 (citing State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 598 (Ariz. 1995);
Barron v. State, 452 S.E.2d 504, 505 n.2 (Ga. 1995); Phillips v. State, 782 P.2d 381, 382 (Nev.
1989); Commonwealth v. Siciliano, 471 N.E.2d 1359, 1362 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)).
122. 726 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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Martinez that a defendant waives his right to testify if he does not
affirmatively object, instead agreeing with Judge Reinhardt’s powerful
dissent.123 In order to fully protect the fundamental constitutional rights of
a criminal defendant, “[i]t appears that the only clear way to establish
whether the defendant is waiving his right to testify is to require trial judges
to establish on the record that the defendant understands his right to testify
and is waiving that right.”124
IV. WHY THIS AREA OF CRIMINAL LAW SHOULD BE EXAMINED
BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court must examine a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to testify for several reasons. The inconsistencies in circuit courts’
interpretations of Rock v. Arkansas are being exacerbated by the Eighth
Circuit’s reliance upon the outdated and no longer relevant statutory
granting of the right of criminal defendants to testify. Other circuit courts,
as well as North Dakota’s Supreme Court, have since relied on the incorrect
Eighth Circuit precedent, further compounding the problem. In addition to
this, there are also a number of practical considerations regarding a criminal
defendant’s right to testify.
A. THE IMPACT A DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY HAS ON THE JURY
A criminal defendant’s testimony can have a tremendous impact on the
jury. It is important that defendants alone should hold the “ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding [his or her]
case,” including whether or not to testify on their own behalves.125 While
defense counsel bears the primary burden of advising the defendant of his
right to testify or not to testify and the strategic implications of each choice,
the decision on whether or not to testify ultimately rests with the
defendant.126
A defendant’s failure to become a witness might well be considered as
a circumstance unfavorable to the defendant, which is why it is necessary to
instruct the jury not to consider it unfavorable.127 The very fact that a jury
could consider unfavorable the defendant not testifying on his own behalf,
thus necessitating an instruction on the matter, must raise suspicions
regarding the actual prejudice it creates for a defendant. In fact, actual
123. Id. at 598; see also supra Part III.B.
124. LaVigne v. State, 788 P.2d 52, 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990), conviction rev’d, 812 P.2d
217, 222 (Alaska 1991).
125. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
126. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992).
127. State v. Wisnewski, 102 N.W. 883, 884 (N.D. 1905).
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unfairness often results when a defendant does not testify because the
defendant himself is often the most effective witness for the defense.128
“The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as
the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.”129
Furthermore, juries, despite limiting instructions, are highly prone to infer
guilt from a criminal defendant’s failure to take the stand.130
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A number of practical considerations also exist regarding whether or
not a defendant must affirmatively waive his right to testify on the record.
These practical considerations emphasize the importance of a truly
informed waiver and consistency in protecting fundamental rights. Courts
often use the excuse of not wanting to pry into the attorney-client
relationship in support of not determining on the record whether a
defendant is knowingly and intelligently relinquishing his right to testify.131
This argument is unpersuasive.
A simple on-the-record inquiry at trial may be done outside the
presence of the jury and would take up very little time in court. This small
inquiry by the court encourages, rather than undermines, the attorney-client
relationship. In asking the defendant if he wishes to give up his right to
testify, both the client and his attorney have a chance to rethink the matter.
If the defendant is in any way unsure about testifying, he and his attorney
have another chance to effectively communicate with each other and
discuss this very important constitutional right, as well as anything else they
may wish to discuss.132
In any event, this small inquiry at trial does far less damage, if any, to
the attorney-client relationship than an entire post-trial hearing on the
matter, which forces the client to waive his attorney-client privilege in order
to testify on the matter.133 Further, without any indication in the trial record
128. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
129. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).
130. See, e.g., McCormick, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 89 (2d ed. 1972).
131. See Case Comment, Criminal Law—Right to Testify—Seventh Circuit Holds That
Defendant’s Waiver of the Right to Testify Was Valid Despite District Court’s Failure to Engage
in an On-The-Record Colloquy Regarding the Decision, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1663-64
(2008).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1666 (explaining that judges can briefly explain to defendants the right to testify
and ask a few “well-crafted questions” about the decision of testifying. Doing this puts enough
evidence on the record to uphold the waiver against a challenge while carefully avoiding prying
into the substance of the attorney-client relationship. When the record is devoid of such
information, this leaves room for an intrusive, detailed inquiry into the timing and substance
between the attorney and defendant at a post-trial hearing. Defendants must waive the attorney-
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that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify,
reviewing courts will have a difficult time proving that a waiver actually
occurred.
C. RECOMMENDATION
It is this Note’s recommendation that trial courts should seek an on-therecord waiver of a defendant’s right to testify in order to ensure that this
waiver is indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. An inquiry by the
court would prevent the unwitting relinquishment of this right by a
defendant who is either unaware of his control over the decision or not
sufficiently sophisticated to raise the issue with the court.134 By doing this,
a record would be made that a defendant has been notified about this right
that he himself controls.
The Supreme Court has made on-the-record statements mandatory for
waiving other personal rights, such as the right to a jury trial when a
defendant pleads guilty and the right to an attorney.135 These on-the-record
statements can promote communications between the attorney and client
before and during trial.136 Effective attorney-client communication before
and at trial, along with courts making an on-the-record colloquy of the
defendant’s knowledge of his right to testify, as well as an informed
decision to waive that right, all ensure that defendants have no doubt as to
their rights and the implications of waiving them. This prevents a muddled
appeals process with an ambiguous record. It also prevents the defendant
from feeling like his attorney did not effectively explain his right to him and
unilaterally waived it without the defendant’s consent. At the very least, a
trial court’s on-the-record inquiry will serve as a quick reminder to both the
attorney and client that they need to communicate with each other regarding
the decision of whether the defendant should testify.
V. CONCLUSION
There are several reasons why the defendant’s right to testify is an
issue that needs readdressing by the Supreme Court. First, there is
confusion among circuit and district courts in how to properly ensure that a
defendant is making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of this
client privilege and attorneys must breach their confidentiality obligations at these hearings. The
attorney and client are in the “uncomfortable” position of being directly in opposition of
one-another, when a few simple questions at trial could prevent complicated and unnecessary
proceedings and appeals).
134. United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 764 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
135. See supra Parts II.A-B.
136. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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right. Some district courts hold that an on-the-record inquiry is required,
while a minority of other courts have stated that such an approach is highly
advisable. The majority of courts, however, hold that there is no
requirement for a court to do so. The majority of courts fail to recognize
the inconsistency in their approaches in determining waiver of
constitutional rights. The right to counsel and the right to a jury trial must
be affirmatively waived on the record, while the right to testify, which is
arguably the most important of these rights, is presumed to be waived
absent any indication that the defendant actually wishes to do so. Even
more disturbing is the reliance by some circuit courts on outdated and
irrelevant law regarding the statutory grant of the right to testify, rather than
the guaranteed constitutional right found in Rock v. Arkansas. The issue is
ripe for consideration, and the Supreme Court would be very wise in
reconsidering this extremely important issue.
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